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Abstract 
 
Life-cycle assessment (LCA) is an effective technique widely used to estimate the 
emissions produced during the entire life-cycle of a fuel or a product. However, most of 
the conventional LCA methods consider the risk of voluntary releases such as emissions, 
discharges or energy use. In other words, involuntary risks such as accident risks 
associated with exploration, production, storage, process and transportation have been 
overlooked. For hazardous materials involuntary risks could be significant; thus, ignoring 
this may result in imprecise LCA. The present study aims to develop a methodology for 
risk-based life-cycle assessment (RBLCA) of fossil fuels by integrating both the 
voluntary and involuntary risks (risk associated with potential accidents) of hazardous 
materials. The risk associated with potential accidents is estimated using Bayesian 
network approach. This provides a robust probabilistic platform of LCA. The application 
of the developed methodology is demonstrated for liquefied natural gas (LNG) and heavy 
fuel oil (HFO) as fuels of a hypothetical power plant. The comparative analysis of two 
fuels based on RBLCA helps an analyst not only overcome data uncertainty but also 
identify holistically green and safer fuel option. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
1.1 Overview 
In recent decades, rapid industrial development has led to steady growth in energy 
consumption all around the world. Meanwhile, the availability and well-controlled nature 
of fossil fuels have considerably made them popular among energy consumers. 
Nevertheless, the combustion of fossil fuels results in greenhouse gas (GHG) emission to 
the atmosphere, which consequently poses the greatest environmental threat in our time; 
that is, global warming. There is a scientific consensus on climate change that the average 
temperature of the earth has raised between 0.4 and 0.8 °C over the past 100 years. 
Furthermore, scientists from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate carrying out global 
warming research have recently predicted that average global temperatures could increase 
between 1.4 and 5.8 °C by the year 2100 [1]. This important issue and the all-around 
energy supply domination by fossil fuels have raised questions about which fossil fuel is 
cleaner, and has the least impact on the environment. 
Among fossil fuels, natural gas (NG) is believed to be a cleaner fuel since its combustion 
emits much lower GHGs than those of oil and coal. Having the lowest carbon content of 
any fossil fuels, NG releases up to 50% less CO2 than coal and about 20-30% less CO2 
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than oil, when burned [2]. The combustion of natural gas also produces less Nitrogen 
oxide (NOx), Sulfur dioxide (SO2), mercury (Hg), and particulate matters (PM) 
compared to oil and coal. 
Less emission from combustion, however, does not tell the full story. Natural gas 
primarily consists of methane (CH4), accounting for 70-90% of the total volume [3], 
which is a potent GHG and far more powerful than CO2. Inevitable leakage of NG 
occurring in different stages through its life-cycle results in significant air emissions. To 
discover the fuel with the lowest GHG emission, a thorough comparison needed to be 
done considering all potential emission sources of heat-trapping gases during every single 
stage of the fuel life cycle.  
Life Cycle Assessment (LCA) is a “cradle to grave” technique to assess the 
environmental impacts of a product or process through its life-cycle [4]. However, 
conventional LCA methods consider the environmental impacts of voluntary releases 
such as emissions, discharges or energy use. Thus, dealing with the amount of GHG 
emissions, in LCA, even minor accidents due to the emissions they can pose are of 
paramount importance. For instance, in April 2004, a routine maintenance operation went 
wrong in the Sonatrach Skikda LNG plant in Nigeria, and led to a boiler explosion. The 
explosion destroyed three out of six trains in the plant completely, which caused tones of 
air emissions in addition to many injuries and fatalities [5]. Although such accidents are 
rare, the dramatic consequence they cause cannot be ignored. 
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1.2 Current Research Gaps 
Recently, LCA has been widely employed by researchers to assess and compare the GHG 
emissions associated with different fuels such as LNG, Coal, and Fuel Oil. However, 
these studies and most of conventional LCA methods developed by Society of 
Environmental Toxicology and Chemistry (SETAC) or Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) consider the issue of LCA from a pure chemical engineering perspective. In other 
words, merely the risks of discharged toxic substances are taken into account while other 
important risks such as those associated with the storage, production, process and 
transportation of hazardous materials (e.g., fires, explosions, and toxic gases) have been 
overlooked. This, in turn, can result in non-holistic and in some cases wrong decisions as 
an alternative with less environmental emissions may seem less hazardous and thus 
preferable. Although there recently have been attempts to couple risk analysis and LCA 
to develop Life Cycle Risk Analysis (LCRA) methodologies [6-8], in none of them the 
risks of abovementioned accidents have been taken into account.  
 
1.3 Research Objectives 
The present study aims to develop a Risk-based Life Cycle Assessment (RBLCA) 
methodology not only to consider the risks of toxic environmental discharges which are 
assessed in conventional LCA, but also to quantify the risks of potential fires and 
explosions resulted from the leakage of hazardous materials. Therefore, the proposed 
technique takes both voluntary and involuntary risks into the account in order for a 
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holistic risk assessment.  This method integrates two widely known techniques in design 
and operation decision-making; Life-Cycle Assessment and Quantitative Risk 
Assessment, providing a broader perspective for making conscious decisions. The 
proposed method includes four major phases; forming a sensible boundary for each 
product of interest, performing LCA, hazard identification, and risk analysis.  
 
1.4 Thesis Organization  
The thesis is written in a traditional format. Outline of each chapter is described below: 
Chapter 2 presents the literature review pertinent to this thesis, including current relevant 
accidents, conventional and advanced risk analysis approaches, conventional life cycle 
assessment, and current related studies.  
Chapter 3 describes the developed methodology, and mainly discuss conventional risk 
analysis methods such as fault tree and event tree, as well as Bayesian networks, an 
advanced approach. This chapter further discusses mapping fault tree into Bayesian 
network, and conventional life cycle assessment in detail.  
Chapter 4 presents a comparative RBLCA of liquefied natural gas (LNG) and heavy fuel 
oil (HFO) as fuels of a power plant is performed to identify the safest fuel with respect to 
a holistic risk assessment approach. 
Chapter 5 presents the results of LCA and QRA performed for each fuel, LNG and HFO, 
and compare the results for each part. Further, discusses the main causes of the 
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differences in such results. Subsequently, in this chapter, all results are converted to 
dollar value, and are compared to figure out the safer fuel. 
Chapter 6 reports the summary of the thesis and the main conclusions obtained through 
this research. Also, recommendations for future work are presented. 
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Chapter 2 
Literature Review 
 
2.1 Risk Analysis 
2.1.1 Overview 
Risk analysis is very important in processing facilities as they deal with a large amount of 
hazardous chemicals; also, process areas are congested with complex piping, high-
pressure compressors, and separators of which malfunctions and mishaps may lead to 
catastrophic accidents [9,10].  
There have been many fatal explosions and fires imposing major capital loss and 
considerable death toll in the past two decades. On 23 March 2005, the BP refinery 
explosion in Texas City caused 15 deaths and more than 170 injuries [11]. According to 
the final report issued by BP (2005) [12], a lack of process safety measures and 
insufficient risk reduction measures were entirely to blame for the accident. On 7 
February 2010, the Kleen Energy power plant exploded in Middletown, Connecticut, 
U.S., killing 6 and injuring at least 12. The explosion was one of the worst industrial 
disasters in the U.S. in recent years [13]. Most recently, on 20 April 2010, explosion and 
fire on Transocean Ltd's drilling rig killed 11 and injured 17 in the Gulf of Mexico. The 
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failure of a blowout preventer (BOP) has been determined as the primary cause of the 
accident [14]. It is important to broaden the risk analysis scope by considering accident 
scenario and real-time safety analysis in order to predict and continuously update the 
likelihood of catastrophic accidents and to take actions to prevent them.  
Forecasting likely accident scenarios is the most important step in safety analysis. Khan 
(2001) [15] proposed a maximum credible accident scenario approach that short-lists the 
important scenarios based on both their consequences and the likelihood of accident 
occurrence. Delvosalle et al. [16] used two methodologies: MIMAH for the identification 
of major accident hazards, in which no safety system was considered, and MIRAS for the 
identification of reference accident scenarios, in which all the actual safety functions and 
barriers were included in the analysis.  
 
2.1.2 Risk Assessment Methods 
The next step in risk analysis is to quantify the occurrence probability of the selected 
accident scenarios. For this, there are many techniques available, among which fault tree 
(FT), event tree (ET), safety barrier diagram, and Bayesian network (BN) are very 
popular. Although conventional risk assessment methods have played an important role 
in identifying major risks and maintaining safety in process facilities, they suffer 
limitations which restrict their application in the risk analysis of complex and interlinked 
systems.  
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For example, conventional FTs, as one of the most popular techniques used in 
quantitative risk analysis, are not suitable for analyzing large systems, particularly if the 
system presents redundant failures, common cause failures, or mutually exclusive 
primary events. More importantly, events in a conventional FT are assumed independent, 
which is not usually a valid assumption [10,17,18]. 
Likewise, most of the limitations of conventional techniques such as FT and ET arise due 
to the static nature of these methods that fails to catch up with the dynamic operation 
environment of process systems. This dynamic nature can be either due to any change in 
the process environment or operational situation such as variations in temperature, 
pressure, humidity and geometry or due to change in analyst’s initial beliefs as new data 
in form of near-misses, mishaps, incidents, and accidents become available over time.  
 
2.1.3 Dynamic Risk Analysis 
There have been efforts to make risk assessment methods dynamically adapted as real-
time changes occur in a process. Shalev and Tiran [19] introduced condition-based fault 
tree (CBFT) in which failure rates of components are periodically updated using 
information obtained through predictive maintenance. Consequently, the failure 
probability of the top event is updated by recalculating the FT for new failure rates. 
However, their method has to be implemented in specific conditions where, for example, 
gradual deterioration process of a component can be discretized into several stages at 
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each of which there should be a correlation between residual time of the component and 
its total failure time. 
The issue of deficiency of conventional methods in dynamic risk analysis has remarkably 
been addressed by introducing the application of Bayesian techniques in the field of risk 
assessment and safety analysis in the late 1970s (see Apostolakis, 1978 [20]; Parry and 
Winter, 1981 [21]). Bayesian methods have proven to be an effective technique in 
handling sparse data as well as different sources of information, and also a well suited 
framework for subjective probability domains such as decision making under uncertainty 
[22]. Accordingly, several forms of Bayesian analysis such as two-stage Bayesian 
methods [23] and empirical Bayes methods (e.g., Carlin and Lous [24]; Martiz and Lwin, 
[25]) have been applied in the context of probabilistic risk analysis. Consequently, there 
have been many works to equip conventional risk analysis methods such as FT and ET 
with Bayesian techniques for dynamic risk analysis. For example, Ching and Leu [26] 
also used Bayesian theory to update FT while Kalantarnia et al. [27], Meel and Seider 
[28], and Rathnayaka et al. [29] used Bayesian theory to update the failure probability of 
the safety functions of an ET.  
Apart from the aforementioned efforts, other researchers have attempted to substitute 
Bayesian network (BN) for reliability block diagrams [10], static FTs [17], Dynamic FTs 
[30,31] and ETs [32].  
BNs have provided a promising framework for system safety analysis and risk 
management [33]. A comprehensive and state of the art application of Bayesian inference 
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and Bayesian network in risk analysis can be found in Kelly and Smith [34], Siu and 
Kelly [22], and Weber et al. [35]. Further, there are attempts to substitute Markov models 
for FT [36] or to construct dynamic FT and ET from corresponding Markov models such 
that time-dependent failures can be taken into account [37]. However, the application of 
Markov models in complex systems has been limited due to the well-known problem of 
state-space explosion and also the error-prone mapping procedure [30]. 
 
2.2 Life Cycle Assessment 
2.2.1 History of LCA 
The first studies that looked at life cycle aspects of products and materials, focusing on 
issues such as energy efficiency, the consumption of raw materials, and to some extent, 
waste disposal, date from the late sixties and early seventies. For instance, the Coca Cola 
Company in 1969 conducted a study to compare resource consumption and 
environmental releases associated with beverage containers. Meanwhile, a similar 
inventory approach was being developed in Europe, later known as the ‘Eco balance’ 
[38]. 
Later, in 1979, the Society of Environmental Toxicology and Chemistry (SETAC) was 
stablished to work as a non-profit professional society in order to promote multi-
disciplinary approaches to investigate environmental issues. In the late 1980s, life-cycle 
assessment appeared to be an approach to better understand the risks, opportunities and 
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trade-offs of product systems in addition to the environmental impacts. The term “life 
cycle assessment” was coined at the first SETAC-sponsored international workshop in 
1990 [39]. 
In early 1993, a group of SETAC experts were tasked with making a recommendation 
regarding standardization of LCA, by the International Organization for Standardization 
(ISO). As a result, the ISO14040 standard for Life cycle assessment – Principles and 
framework was completed by 1997. Then, a few additional standards were set and 
reviewed, and finally compiled in 2006 in the form of ISO 14044 Life cycle assessment – 
Requirements and guidelines [39]. 
More LCA guidelines and standards have subsequently been developed including the 
World Resource Institute and World Business Council for Sustainable Development’s 
PAS 2050:2011 Specification in order to assess the greenhouse gas emissions associated 
with products and services life cycles. In 2012, the European Commission Joint Research 
Centre’s Institute for Environment and Sustainability published the International 
Reference Life Cycle Data System Handbook as part of the European life cycle push and 
to further specify the broader provisions of the ISO 14040 and 14044 standards [39]. 
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2.2.2 Life Cycle Assessment Definition and Procedure 
Life-Cycle Assessment (LCA) is a technique for systematic evaluation of the 
environmental impacts of a product or process throughout its entire life, from raw 
material extraction to the final disposal or recycling (cradle to grave) [40]. 
According to ISO 14044, the framework of LCA consists of four phases; goal and scope 
definition, inventory analysis, impact assessment, and interpretation.  
The first step in LCA, goal definition, as its name suggests includes determining the 
desired goal for performing the LCA study, the intended audience, and the intended 
application, while the scope of a LCA is the planning stages and areas of determination 
such as system boundaries, functional unit/allocation, data requirements/quality, and 
report format/need for critical review [41].  
The life cycle inventory analysis, as second phase of LCA, deals with collection of the 
necessary data to meet the objectives of the LCA study. Implementation of a life cycle 
inventory begins the process of assigning emission values to operations within the 
defined boundary of the system of interest. Further, the corresponding calculations may 
differ depending on the data source, whether actual monitored data or an existing 
inventory database is utilized [41].  
The next step in LCA is life cycle impact assessment (LCIA) trying to convert the life 
cycle inventory results into the related environmental impacts – effects on natural 
resource use, natural environment and human health. A LCIA consists of two mandatory 
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steps: classification and characterisation. Classification involves dividing the life cycle 
impact results into impact categories – e.g. global warming, acidification, and human 
toxicity. In characterisation, the potential impact of each emission or resource use is 
estimated, using certain scientific factors [41]. 
The last step in a LCA, life cycle interpretation, according to ISO 14044 a number checks 
to ensure that the conclusions are sufficiently supported by the data and procedures 
utilized in the study. These checks may include uncertainty, sensitivity, and contribution 
analysis. The results, then, are reported, and the need and opportunities to reduce the 
impact of the products or services on the environment are systematically evaluated [102]. 
 
2.2.3 Related Studies  
Recently, LCA has been widely employed by researchers to assess and compare the GHG 
emissions associated with different fuels. 
Howarth et al. [42] studies the life-cycle emissions from shale gas production. The study 
indicated that conventional gas has almost no advantage over coal whereas shale gas has 
higher life-cycle GHG emissions than coal, due largely to methane emissions during the 
extraction process. Using new data and comparing the warming potential of methane and 
carbon dioxide during a 20-year time period, Howarth [43] later declared that both shale 
gas and conventional natural gas have a larger GHG than coal or oil, particularly for the 
primary uses of residential and commercial heating. Hultman et al. [44] compared the 
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life-cycle GHG footprints of conventional gas, shale gas and coal, primarily focusing on 
the electricity generation sector. The authors showed that the GHG impacts of shale gas 
are slightly higher than those of conventional gas, while those of both conventional and 
shale gases remain considerably lower than those of coal, under standard assumptions. 
They reported air emission impacts of shale gas 11% higher than those of conventional 
gas, and 44% lower than those of coal. In a similar effort, Skone et al. [45] performed a 
very detailed study of life-cycle emissions from electricity generated from several 
sources of natural gas, including conventional and unconventional natural gas, and two 
types of coal. The analysis found that the natural gas-based electricity production has life 
cycle GHG emissions 35% to 66% lower than those of coal-based. Rose et al. [46] 
conducted a comparative LCA of diesel and compressed natural gas (CNG) used as fuel 
in heavy duty vehicles. The analysis utilized real-time operational data obtained from the 
city of Surrey in British Columbia, Canada. The authors reported that CNG powered 
vehicles result in a considerably less GHG emissions, about 24% compared to diesel 
powered vehicles. 
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Chapter 3 
Methodology 
 
 
The method proposed in this study for RBLCA integrates two widely known techniques 
in design and operation decision-making; LCA and QRA, enabling making more 
exhaustive decisions by considering not only the emissions but also the accident risks. 
The methodology includes four major phases: 1) forming a sensible boundary for each 
life-cycle, 2) performing LCA, 3) hazard identification, and 4) risk analysis. In order for 
comparison of the environmental impacts of different fuels in the present study, the 
outcomes of both LCA and QRA converted to dollar value. Figures 1 illustrates a 
schematic diagram of RBLCA methodology.  
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Figure 1. Risk-Based Life Cycle Assessment Diagram 
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3.1 Life-Cycle Assessment 
LCA is a tool employed to estimate the adverse effects the creation of a product or a 
process has on the environment and human health. To holistically evaluate the 
environmental effects, LCA should include raw materials extraction, manufacturing, 
processing, transportation, consumption, maintenance, recycle and waste disposal. 
Consequently, LCA can be used as an informed decision making tool to choose the 
alternative, whether products or processes, which is the least harmful to the environment. 
A typical LCA comprises several steps such as goal determination, boundaries 
identification, inventory analysis, impact analysis, and improvement analysis [47].  
LCA methods are basically data intensive and time consuming. Thus, it is necessary to 
set the analysis’ goals and the boundaries in the first step in order to limit the analysis 
only to a few important processes during the LCA of a product. To tackle the foregoing 
issue, several LCA methodologies have been developed such as streamlined LCA [48] 
and input/output LCA [49, 50] which are less data intensive and do not need to reduce the 
number of processes to consider. Among the aforementioned steps, inventory analysis is 
of great importance as the quantities of both the required materials/energy and the 
environmental discharges (into air, water, and soil) are estimated. In the next step, the 
impact analysis, the effects of toxic discharges and emissions on the environment and the 
human are assessed using exposure pathway modeling and dose-effect relationships. The 
aim of improving analysis is to reduce the harmful effects by either reducing the amount 
of toxic discharges or devising appropriate safety measures [47].  It is worth noting that 
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the application of risk analysis to LCA has been through the impact analysis or improving 
analysis. 
In life-cycle assessment with regard to GHG emission, direct measurements at an 
emission source seem to provide the most reliable information. Due to lack of such data, 
however, emission factors, in spite of their limitations, have been widely employed for 
emissions estimation [51]. 
Emission factors are representative values relating the quantity of an emission 
(atmospheric emission) with the activity generating the emission. To estimate these 
emission factors, the weight of emission is usually divided by a unit weight, volume, 
distance, or duration of the activity of concern (i.e., the emitting activity); for example, 
kilograms of CO2 emitted per ton of coal burned. Facilitating the estimation of emissions, 
such factors can be considered as the long-term average of available data yet with an 
acceptable level of quality, obtained from all facilities in the emission source [51]. The 
general equation for emission estimation is: 
𝐸 = 𝐴. 𝐸𝐹. (1 −
𝐸𝑅
100
)                                                                                           (3.1)  
Where E is the emission; A is the activity rate; EF is the emission factor, and ER is the 
overall emission reduction efficiency. 
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3.2 Risk Assessment 
In the recent decades, risk analysis has become an integral part to informed decision 
making and design of processing facilities due to large inventories of toxic, flammable, 
and explosive materials which could pose serious harms to human health, the 
environment, and the assets. Process plants are also attributed with large number of 
equipment and complex pipeline networks. As a result, any normal accident which could 
easily have been controlled or tolerated in other infrastructures has the potential to turn 
into a catastrophe via domino effects [52].  
Quantitative risk analysis (QRA) focuses on quantifying the occurrence probability of 
envisaged accident scenarios. There are many techniques available, among which fault 
tree (FT), event tree (ET), and Bayesian network (BN) are very popular. Although 
conventional risk assessment methods have played an important role in identifying major 
risks and maintaining safety in process facilities, they suffer limitations which restrict 
their application in the risk analysis of complex and dependent systems. For example, 
conventional FT, which is one of the most popular QRA techniques, are not suitable for 
analyzing large systems, particularly if the system presents sequential failures, common 
cause failures, or dependent primary events. More importantly, events in a conventional 
FT are assumed independent, which is not usually a valid assumption [17,18,53]. 
Likewise, most of the limitations of conventional techniques such as FT and ET arise due 
to the static nature of these methods that fails to capture the dynamic nature of process 
systems. This dynamicity can be either due to changes in the process environment or 
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operational situation such as variations in temperature, pressure, humidity and geometry 
or due to changes in analyst’s initial beliefs based on observed near accident or accident 
data. As a result, dynamic QRA methods mostly based on Bayesian network (BN) have 
begun to become popular among risk society and safety experts. 
 
3.2.1 Fault Tree 
Fault Tree is a deductive, structured methodology to determine the potential causes of an 
undesired event, referred to as the top event. The top event usually represents a major 
accident causing safety hazards or economic loss [54]. While the top event is placed at 
the top of the tree, the tree is constructed downwards, dissecting the system for further 
detail until the primary event leading to the top event are known. Primary events are 
considered binary (with two states) and statistically independent. In an FT, the 
relationships between events are represented by means of gates, of which AND-gates and 
OR-gates are the most widely used.  
Once completed, the FT can be analyzed both qualitatively and quantitatively. In the 
qualitative evaluation, using Boolean algebra, an expression is derived for the top event 
in terms of combinations of primary events. In the quantitative part, the probability of the 
top event is expressed in terms of the occurrence probability of the primary events or in 
terms of the minimal cut-sets. Small FTs can be evaluated manually; however, large and 
complex FTs require the aid of computerized methods for evaluation. Methods for FT 
analysis include the analytical method, Monte Carlo simulation, and binary decision 
21 
 
diagram. Due to limitations in using the Monte Carlo simulation, an analytical approach 
(e.g., minimal cut-sets determination) is more frequently used for evaluation of a FT. To 
reduce the margin of error due to inaccuracy and incompleteness of the data of the 
primary events, some authors have recently used fuzzy set theory and evidence theory in 
FT analysis [55-58]. 
Fault trees are built using gates and events. The two most commonly used gates in a fault 
tree are the AND and OR gates. As an example, consider two events comprising a top 
event (or a system). If occurrence of either event causes the top event to occur, then these 
events are connected using an OR gate. As a result, the probability of the top event would 
be equal to the union of the events’ probabilities. On the other hand, if both events need 
to occur to cause the top event to occur, they are connected by an AND gate. 
Accordingly, the probability of the top event would be equal to the intersection of the 
events’ probabilities. As a visualization example, Figure 2 shows the two typical AND 
(left) and OR (right) gates and their corresponding Boolean algebra.  
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Figure 2. AND gate (left) and OR gate (right) in fault trees 
 
Since conventional fault trees are unable to consider conditional dependencies, the events 
in such fault trees are presumably considered as independent. As a result, the 
corresponding Boolean algebra for AND gate and OR gate will be: 
𝑃(𝐴𝑁𝐷) = 𝑃(𝐴 ∩ 𝐵 ∩ 𝐶) = 𝑃(𝐴)𝑃(𝐵)𝑃(𝐶)                                (3.2) 
𝑃(𝑂𝑅) = 𝑃(𝐴 ∪ 𝐵 ∪ 𝐶) = 1 − (1 − 𝑃(𝐴))(1 − 𝑃(𝐵))(1 − 𝑃(𝐶))                  (3.3) 
It is worth noting that in the case of having more than three events, the respective 
relationship for an OR gate could be written as: 
𝑃(𝐴1 ∪ 𝐴2 ∪ … ∪ 𝐴𝑛) = 1 − ∏ (1 − 𝑃(𝐴𝑖))
𝑛
𝑖=1                     (3.4) 
It should be noted that conventional fault trees usually underestimate or overestimate the 
probability of top events due to their inability in considering conditional dependencies. 
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For example, consider the fault tree in Figure 3, in which the intermediate events X1 and 
X2 share the root event A. A is usually considered as a common-cause failure.  
 
TE
X1 X2
BA CA
 
Figure 3. A fault tree with common-cause failure A.  
 
According to the logical relationship embedded in AND gate, the probabilities of X1 and 
X2 will be 
 𝑃(𝑋1) = 𝑃(𝐴)𝑃(𝐵)                         (3.5) 
and 
 𝑃(𝑋2) = 𝑃(𝐴)𝑃(𝐶)                         (3.6)  
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Consequently, assuming that X1 and X2 are independent (which is the common 
assumption in the fault tree) the probability of TE (Top Event) will be calculated as: 
𝑃(𝑇𝐸) = 𝑃(𝑋1 ∩ 𝑋2) = 𝑃(𝑋1)𝑃(𝑋2) = 𝑃(𝐴)2𝑃(𝐵)𝑃(𝐶)                  (3.7) 
However, as we know, X1 and X2 are not independent since they share the common 
cause A. As a result: 
𝑃(𝑇𝐸) = 𝑃(𝑋1 ∩ 𝑋2) = 𝑃(𝑋1)𝑃(𝑋2|𝑋1) = 𝑃(𝐴)𝑃(𝐵)𝑃(𝐶)                  (3.8) 
Comparing the probabilities of the top event given by Equations (3.7) and (3.8), it can be 
seen that the fault tree in Figure 3 underestimates the top event by a factor of P(A). 
Similarly, if X1 and X2 were connected to TE by means of an OR gate, the respective 
probability would be overestimated instead. Although such limitation of conventional 
fault trees can be relaxed by relying on state-dependent methods such as Markov chains 
and Bayesian network [53], which BN method is discussed in the next section. 
 
3.2.2 Bayesian Network 
BNs are increasingly used for the construction of system reliability models, risk 
management, and safety analysis based on probabilistic and uncertain knowledge. Similar 
to other graphical probabilistic methods (e.g., fault tree and reliability block diagram), 
BNs consist of both qualitative and quantitative parts. BNs are directed acyclic graphs, in 
which the nodes represent variables, arcs signify direct causal relationships between the 
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linked nodes, and the conditional probability tables assigned to the nodes specify how 
strongly the linked nodes influence each other. In BNs, the nodes without any arc 
directed into them are called root nodes, possessing marginal prior probabilities. All other 
nodes are intermediate nodes and each one is assigned a conditional probability table 
(CPT). Among intermediate nodes, the nodes having arcs directed into them are called 
child nodes and the nodes that have arcs directed from them are called parent nodes 
(Figure 4). Each child has an associated CPT, given all combinations of the states of its 
parent nodes. Nodes without any child are also called leaf nodes. 
 
B
A
C
D
A: Root node, Parent of B and C
B: Intermediate node, child of A, parent of C
C: Intermediate node, child of A and B, 
parent of D
D: Leaf node, child of C
 
Figure 4. A typical Bayesian network 
 
BN takes advantage of the "d-separation" criterion [59-61] and the chain rule to calculate 
conditional dependencies. Node A is d-separated from node C if node B blocks the path 
between A and C. In this case, A is conditionally independent of C given B; i.e., 
P(A│B,C) = P(A│B). In either a serial path or a diverging path (Figures 5a and 5b), A 
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and C are d-separated from each other if the state of B is known. In a converging path 
(Figure 5c), A and C are independent if the state of B is unknown. Based on these three 
conditions, in a BN all root nodes are conditionally independent of each other and the 
other nodes are conditionally dependent on only their direct parents [17]. 
According to the conditional independence and the chain rule, BNs represent the joint 
probability distribution P(U) of variables U = {A1, A2, … , An} included in the network as: 
P(U) = ∏ P(Ai|Pa(Ai))
n
i=1                         (3.9) 
Where 𝑃𝑎(𝐴𝑖) is the parents of 𝐴𝑖in the BN, and P(U) reflects the properties of the BN 
[60]. Figure 5 summarizes the three probabilistic relationships commonly used in a BN 
[62]. 
 
 
Figure 5. d-separation Criteria (Wilson and Huzurbazar, 2007) 
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Using Equation (3.9), the joint probability distribution of the variables included in the BN 
in Figure 4 can be represented as P(U) = P(A,B,C,D) = P(A) P(B│A) P(C│A,B) 
P(D│C). BN’s main application in accident analysis is an inference engine for updating 
the prior occurrence probability of events given new information, called evidence E. The 
new information is usually operational data including occurrence or non-occurrence of 
the accident or primary events:  
P(U|E) =
P(U,E)
P(E)
=
P(U,E)
∑ P(U,E)U
                     (3.10) 
Equation (3.10) can be used for either probability prediction or probability updating. In 
predictive analysis, conditional probabilities of the form P (Accident│event) are 
calculated, indicating the occurrence probability of a particular accident given the 
occurrence or non-occurrence of a certain primary event. On the other hand, in updating 
analysis, those of the form P(event│Accident) are evaluated, showing the occurrence 
probability of a particular event given the occurrence of a certain accident [63]. BNs are 
increasingly used in risk analysis and safety assessment. Khakzad et al. [53] have 
examined the parallels between BNs and FTs and have shown the obvious superiority of 
BNs over FTs in terms of modeling and analysis capabilities. Bobbio et al. [17] showed 
that the limitations of FTs can be relaxed to a great extent by relying on BNs. Other 
relevant works have been done by mapping dynamic FTs into the dynamic BNs 
[30,31,64]. A comprehensive review of Bayesian network application in risk analysis, 
safety assessment, and reliability engineering can be found in Weber et al. [35]. 
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3.2.3 Event Tree 
Event tree analysis (ETA) is an analysis technique for identifying and evaluating the 
sequence of events in a potential accident scenario following the occurrence of an 
initiating event. ETA utilizes a visual logic tree structure known as an event tree (ET). 
The objective of ETA is to determine whether the initiating event will develop into a 
serious mishap or if the event is sufficiently controlled by the safety systems and 
procedures implemented in the system design. An ETA can result in many different 
possible outcomes from a single initiating event, and it provides the capability to obtain a 
probability for each outcome. 
ETA is a binary form of a decision tree for evaluating the various multiple decision paths 
in a given problem. ETA appears to have been developed during the WASH-1400 nuclear 
power plant safety study (Circa, 1974). The WASH-1400 team realized that a nuclear 
power plant probabilistic risk analysis could be achieved by FTA; however, the resulting 
fault trees would be very large and cumbersome, and they therefore established ETA to 
condense the analysis into a more manageable picture, while still utilizing FTA. 
ETA has been successfully applied to a wide range of systems, such as nuclear power 
plants, spacecraft, and chemical plants. Considering an undesired event as the initiating 
event (IE) of an event tree, there will be two branches at every top event (TE) or safety 
measure. These branches usually represent the failure/function or present/absent of safety 
measures or occurrence/non-occurrence of a sequence of events. Figure 6 illustrates a 
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typical ET with one IE and two TEs. As a result, four outcomes or consequences could 
have been envisaged, C1, C2, C3, and C4. 
IE
TE1
TE2
C1
C2
C3
C4
 
Figure 6. A typical event tree 
 
Having the required probabilities, the probabilities of consequences can readily be 
calculated. For example, the probabilities of C1-C4 in Figure 6 can be calculated as: 
𝑃(𝐶1) = 𝑃(𝐼𝐸). (1 − 𝑃(𝑇𝐸1)). (1 − 𝑃(𝑇𝐸2))                   (3.11) 
𝑃(𝐶2) = 𝑃(𝐼𝐸). (1 − 𝑃(𝑇𝐸1)). 𝑃(𝑇𝐸2)                   (3.12) 
𝑃(𝐶3) = 𝑃(𝐼𝐸). 𝑃(𝑇𝐸1). (1 − 𝑃(𝑇𝐸2))                    (3.13) 
𝑃(𝐶1) = 𝑃(𝐼𝐸). 𝑃(𝑇𝐸1). 𝑃(𝑇𝐸2)                    (3.14) 
In an ET usually the last consequence (e.g., C4 in Figure 6) has the lowest probability 
and the highest severity. 
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3.2.4 Mapping fault tree into Bayesian network 
To overcome the limitations of the FT mentioned before (e.g., binary events and 
independent events) and also taking advantage of probability updating, FT can be 
mapped to a corresponding BN. In the mapping algorithm, the basic events, intermediate 
events, and the top event of the FT are represented as root nodes, intermediate nodes, and 
the leaf node of the BN, respectively. The capability of BN in the incorporation of several 
leaf nodes, as opposed to only one top event in FT, is another feature making BN a 
superior technique to FT. Likewise; the probabilities of the basic events in the FT are 
allocated as the marginal probabilities of the corresponding root nodes in the BN. The 
Boolean gates (e.g., AND/OR gates) can be converted into appropriate conditional 
probabilities [17,18,53]. 
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Chapter 4 
Application of the methodology 
 
4.1 Case study 
To see the influence of the inclusion of accident risk analysis in LCA of different 
products/processes, we consider a hypothetical power plant in Holyrood in 
Newfoundland, Canada, which can operate using either LNG or HFO as the power plant 
fuel. After each fuel supply chain to the power plant was determined, LCA and QRA will 
be performed for specific stages along the supply chains. It should be noted that the last 
stage of the fossil fuel life cycles, that is, combustion in power plant, is excluded for 
either fuel in the present study. Figures 7 and 8 illustrate schematic diagrams of RBLCA 
of LNG and HFO, respectively.  
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Figure 7. Risk-based life-cycle assessment of liquefied natural gas (LNG) 
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Figure 8. Risk-based life-cycle assessment of heavy fuel oil (HFO) 
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4.2 Life-Cycle Analysis 
Holyrood thermal station at pick is able to produce three billion kilowatt-hours of 
electricity per year [65]. This electricity amount is used as a basis for required 
calculations in the GHG emission LCA of LNG and HFO. For further calculations in 
LCA, heat rates of 10,354 Btu/kWh and 10,334 Btu/kWh are assumed to be the power 
plant heat rates when it is fueled with natural gas and HFO, respectively [66].  
In the present study, GHG emissions are reported on a common mass basis of carbon 
dioxide equivalents (CO2e) using the global warming potential (GWP) of each gas from 
the Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) of Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) in 2013 [67]. Table 1 shows the GWPs used for the GHGs inventories in the 
current study. All GHG results in this report are expressed as 100-year GWPs unless 
specified otherwise. 
 
Table1. IPCC Global Warming Potentials 
GHG 
AR5 (IPCC 2013) 
20-year 100-year 
CO2 1 1 
CH4 85 30 
N2O 264 265 
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4.2.1 LCA of LNG 
Liquefied natural gas (LNG) is a colourless and odourless liquid, which is made by 
cooling natural gas to a temperature of about -160 ℃ (-260 ℉) at atmospheric pressure. 
The liquefaction process reduces natural gas volume to one six hundredth of its original 
volume, making it feasible to transport over long distances [68].  
Using a natural gas heating value of 1,027 Btu/cf [69] and a density of 0.042 lb/cf [69], 
the total amount of natural gas required to generate 3 billion kilowatt hours of electricity 
can be estimated as 1,270,080,000 lbs using the equation below [70]: 
𝐴𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑑𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑘𝑊ℎ =
𝑝𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒(𝐵𝑡𝑢𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑘𝑊ℎ)
𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡 (𝐵𝑡𝑢𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑢𝑏𝑖𝑐𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑡)
                  (4.1) 
An LNG plant is supposed to be developed in Goldboro in Nova Scotia, Canada, by 2018 
[71]; thus, we assume that LNG fuel required for the power plant in Holyrood, 
Newfoundland, can be provided from Goldboro. After being extracted and processed at 
Thebaud platform, located offshore Nova Scotia, the natural gas is transported through 
the pipeline to Goldboro plant. Natural gas is then liquefied (i.e., converted into LNG) 
and stored in Goldboro plant for exporting. LNG is then transported to Holyrood by ship, 
stored, and then re-gasified in a re-gasification terminal. At last, the gas is sent to the 
hypothetical power plant in Holyrood through pipeline.  
It is assumed that the regasification plant is close to the power plant, so that the emission 
associated with natural gas transportation to power plant is negligible. Furthermore, as 
LNG storage has insignificant emissions compared to the other stages, it will not be taken 
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into the account in the respective LCA in the present work. The sequence of the 
aforementioned processes considered in the LCA of LNG is depicted in the left-hand side 
block of Figure 7. It is worth mentioning that the results and assumptions of National 
Energy Technology Laboratory (NETL) inventory [45] for conventional offshore gas 
have been mostly used for LCA of LNG in the present study. 
 
4.2.1.1 Natural gas extraction 
Extraction of natural gas (NG) is the first section in the LCA of LNG and depending on 
the well type can include sub-sections such as well construction and installation, well 
completion, liquid unloading, and workovers. These activities all result in GHG emission 
either by energy combustion or by gas release occurring during the operations. Another 
key source of air emission, which contributes to almost all sections of LCA, is fugitive 
emissions from the operational equipment. The emission sources accounted for NG 
extraction in this study include well completion, gas venting from wet seal degassing, and 
fugitives from the equipment.  
The emission related to well completion is the NG release that occurs during a well 
development, before equipment have been installed for NG recovery. Well completion 
causes a significant amount of air emission although it is not a part of daily operations. 
The methane emission from the completion of a conventional well is based on emission 
factor developed by EPA; 36.65 Mcf of methane per completion [45]. The emission 
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factor for wet seal degassing accounts for the NG lost during the regeneration of wet seal 
oil, which is used for centrifugal compressors. In this study, we use the emission factor 
calculated by NETL, which is based on sampled venting emissions from 15 offshore 
platforms by EPA, and production rate of a year in US. This emission factor is 0.0069 m3 
of vented gas per m3 of produced NG [45]. The fugitive emissions considered in this 
study include two sorts of emissions; the emissions that cannot be and those that can be 
captured for flaring. The former is related to the methane leakage of pneumatic valves 
and other process control systems. The emission factor for these devices, which is 
estimated like that of wet seal degassing, is 1.95 E -06 lb of methane per lb of produced 
NG [45]. Likewise, gas released from mishaps and equipment such as separators and 
pumps cannot be captured for flaring. NG is also released from wellhead and equipment 
like heaters and blowdown vessel, which can be captured for flaring. For conventional 
wells, 51% of these emissions are flared, while the balance is vented to the atmosphere 
[45]. Table 2 shows the emission factors for fugitive emissions from extraction section. 
The emission factors for unprocessed NG flaring based on API [69] are shown in Table 3. 
Table 2. Emission factors for fugitive emissions during extraction 
NG extraction emission source Value Unit 
Fugitive emissions (captured for flaring) 3.90 E -05 lb CH4/lb NG extracted 
Fugitive emissions (not captured for flaring) 2.41 E -04 lb CH4/lb NG extracted 
Valve fugitive emissions (including pneumatic devices) 1.95 E -06 lb CH4/lb NG extracted 
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Table 3. Unprocessed Natural Gas Flaring Emissions 
Pollutant Value Unit 
CO2 2.67 lb CO2/lb flared NG 
N2O 8.95 E -05 lb N2O/lb flared NG 
CH4 1.53 E -02 lb CH4/lb flared NG 
 
 
4.2.1.2 Natural gas processing 
To meet pipeline quality, raw NG must be cleaned from contaminants such as water, 
carbon dioxide, and hydrogen sulfide (H2S). This is a pre-treatment of raw NG at 
extraction site such that a complete process is usually done at a processing or liquefaction 
plant. This process takes place through different operations depending on the NG type. 
Figure 9 shows a schematic diagram of the typical natural gas processing. In this study, 
we consider key processing operations including acid gas removal (AGR) and 
dehydration. 
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Figure 9. A schematic diagram of natural gas treatment process (www.ihrdc.com) 
 
Amine-based processes are technologies widely used in AGR. The energy combustion by 
an amine reboiler is the major source of GHG emissions in AGR process. In order to 
estimate air emissions by amine reboiler, EPA emission factors for industrial boilers [51], 
which are fuelled by NG, are applied in this study. In addition to the emissions resulted 
from the energy combustion, a portion of CH4 absorbed by amine solution and naturally-
occurring CO2 in raw NG are vented to the atmosphere [45]. Table 4 shows the emission 
factors for AGR process. 
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Table 4. Emission factors for AGR process 
Flow Name Value Unit 
CO2 (combustion) 6.47 E -04 lb CO2/lb NG product 
CO2 (vented) 1.30 E -02 lb CO2/lb NG product 
N2O 3.54 E -06 lb N2O/lb NG product 
CH4 (combustion) 1.27 E -05 lb CH4/ lb NG product 
CH4 (vented) 9.71 E -04 lb CH4/ lb NG product 
 
 
Glycol dehydration is the most common method of water removal from raw NG. Similar 
to AGR process, air emissions from dehydration operations include fuel combustion and 
venting emissions. Reboiler, which here is assumed to be heated by NG combustion, is 
the only equipment in the dehydration system that consumes fuel. In addition to 
absorbing water, the glycol solution also absorbs methane from the NG stream. Flash 
separators capture most of this methane during the process; nonetheless, small amounts 
of it are vented from dehydrators [45]. Table 5 shows the emission factors for 
dehydration operation.  
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Table 5. Emission factors for dehydration 
Flow Name Value Unit 
CO2 4.24 E -04 lb CO2/lb NG product 
N2O 2.26 E -09 lb N2O/lb NG product 
CH4 (combustion) 8.10 E -09 lb CH4/ lb NG product 
CH4 (vented) 8.06 E -06 lb CH4/ lb NG product 
 
 
4.2.1.3 Natural gas transportation (pipeline) 
This study assumes that NG after extraction and process in offshore oil field is 
transported to Goldboro LNG plant by pipeline. Most emissions related to NG 
transportation are produced due to energy combustion by compressors, used to increase 
NG pressure. The energy required for compressor operations is based on comparing 
power requirements to compression ratios. This analysis assumes that the inlet pressure to 
compressors at the NG extraction and processing site is 50 psig while the outlet pressure 
is 800 psig, a standard pressure for pipeline transportation of NG. 
Gas powered centrifugal compressors are commonly used at offshore NG extraction sites. 
A two-stage centrifugal compressor with an inlet pressure of 50 psig and an outlet 
pressure of 800 psig has a power requirement of 187 horsepower per MMcf of NG [72]. 
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The GHG emission for the operation of wellhead centrifugal compressor is shown in 
Table 6. 
 
Table 6. Centrifugal compressor emission factors 
Pollutant Value Unit 
CO2 8.80 E -02 Kg CO2/kg NG 
CH4 6.89 E -06 Kg CH4/kg NG 
N2O 2.40 E -06 Kg N2O/kg NG 
 
 
The pipeline distance in the present study was estimated as 140 miles, which is the 
approximate distance between the extraction field and the location of the hypothetical 
LNG plant. To keep the desired NG pressure, compressor stations are necessary every 50 
to 100 miles along the pipelines. Therefore, it is assumed that there are two compressor 
stations along the pipeline; in this regard, the amount of GHG emissions associated with 
each station is 30% of the total emission produced by the wellhead compressor. 
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4.2.1.4 Natural gas liquefaction  
NG that arrives at a LNG plant, prior to liquefaction, is further treated to remove any 
residual water, sulfur-containing species, and CO2 that might be still present after the 
pre-processing. Moreover, other components that could freeze (e.g. benzene) under the 
low temperatures needed for liquefaction are removed as well as that could be harmful 
(e.g., mercury) to the liquefaction facility. The liquefaction process entails chilling the 
cleaned NG using refrigerants. Going through stages of pre-cooling, liquefaction and sub-
cooling, the NG reaches the desired temperature and is then stored as LNG in double-
walled tanks at atmospheric pressure. Figure 10 illustrates the schematic of the 
liquefaction process at Goldboro Plant, NS, Canada, comprising a gas treatment unit, 
refrigerant compression, and a heat exchanger. GHG emissions associated with 
liquefaction process are mainly due to the fuel gas combustion needed to power 
refrigeration compressors and electrical generators, fired heaters, flares, incinerators, 
venting of CO2, and fugitive emissions in the process [73]. 
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Figure 10. Schematic of liquefaction facility at Goldboro Plant (www.goldborolng.com) 
A few studies have been conducted to quantify the amount of GHG emissions from LNG 
plants. Among those, an estimation of 64 kg CO2 e/MWh by NETL [74] was selected for 
the liquefaction air emissions in the present analysis. 
 
4.2.1.5 LNG transportation 
LNG is transported by specially designed marine tankers (Figure 11) delivering their load 
to receiving terminals. The main source of air emissions in LNG tankers (ships) is fuel 
combustion needed to power their propulsion systems. Hence, emissions from LNG 
transportation relates to the volume of LNG transported and the distance travelled by 
ships. It is assumed that boil-off gases (BOG) from the vessels are either consumed as 
fuel in engines or liquefied and returned to the ship tanks.  
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Figure 11. A typical tank ship used to carry LNG (www.en.wikipedia.org) 
 
Jaramillo et al. [75] conducted a comparative study of LNG, coal, and gas life-cycle 
carbon emissions, and used an equation for estimation of LNG carriers. Their formula 
was adapted in this study to estimate LNG tankers air emissions. Furthermore, the 
distance travelled by the LNG tankers was estimated as 1000 km using Google Map. 
𝐸𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 =
(𝐸𝐹) ∑[(2∗𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑝(
𝐿𝑁𝐺𝑥
𝑇𝐶
))∗
𝐷𝑥
𝑇𝑆
∗𝐹𝐶∗
1
24
]
𝐿𝑁𝐺𝑡
                    (4.2) 
 
where EF is the tanker emission factor of 3,200 kg CO2/ton of fuel consumed; 2 is the 
number of trips each tanker does for delivery of each load; LNGx is the amount of natural 
gas (in cubic feet) brought from each country; TC is the tanker capacity in cubic feet of 
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natural gas (assumed to be 120,000 m
3
 of LNG); Dx is the distance from each country; 
TS is the tanker speed of 14 knots; FC is a fuel consumption of 41 tons of fuel per day; 
and 24 is the number of hours in a day [76]. 
 
4.2.1.6 LNG regasification 
Regasification plants, generally incorporated into LNG receiving terminals, return the 
LNG back into its gaseous state. In regasification plants (Figure 12), LNG is initially 
pumped from the ships into the terminal LNG storage tanks. Then, LNG is either loaded 
onto trucks for transport to smaller costumers’ locations, or pumped to higher pressure 
through high pressure pumps, vaporized in high pressure, and entered into the 
transmission and distribution pipeline systems.  
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Figure 12. Schematic of LNG re-gasification facilities (www.ema.gov.sg) 
 
In a regasification LNG terminal, GHG emission sources include: methane leakage from 
equipment such as flanges, valves, compressors and pumps, venting emissions from LNG 
pumps during maintenance, flaring of BOG from storage tanks during ship unloading (if 
BOG rate exceeds BOG compressor capacity), emissions from fuel combustion used for 
the vaporization process, and venting from the vaporization process and from BOG 
compressors during maintenance [73]. The estimation of 20 kg CO2 e/MWh by NETL 
[74] was selected for the GHG emissions related to regasification plant in this study.  
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4.2.2 LCA of HFO 
HFO is a high-viscosity residual oil that remains after the distillate fuel oils and lighter 
hydrocarbons are distilled away in refinery operations. HFO is the cheapest product of a 
refinery, used for the production of electric power, space heating, vessel bunkering, and 
various industrial purposes [77]. 
Using a HFO heat content of 6.287 MBtu/barrel [78], the total amount of HFO required 
to generate 3 billion kilowatt hours of electricity in Holyrood power plant is estimated to 
be 4,929,000 barrels using Equation (4.1). According to American Petroleum Institute 
(API), based on average of yields for US refineries in 2005, 1.7 gallons of HFO is 
obtained from one barrel (42 gallons) of crude oil. Therefore, approximately 121,775,300 
barrels of crude oil is needed to produce 4,929,000 barrels of HFO. 
The required oil fuel for Holyrood thermal plant is supplied by Philips 66 Company, 
which is an American company that has no refinery in Canada. Thus, in this study the 
origin of oil fuel has been considered in Gulf of Mexico, US. It is supposed that the crude 
oil extracted from Mars platform in the Gulf is transported to one of Philips 66’s refinery, 
Alliance Refinery, Louisiana, US, by ships. After processing of the crude oil, the 
produced oil fuel is stored, and then shipped to Holyrood thermal plant by ship tankers. 
The sequence of the aforementioned processes is depicted in the left-hand side block in 
Figure 8. 
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4.2.2.1 Crude oil recovery 
Crude oil recovery is the first section of HFO life-cycle assessment, and includes well 
drilling, crude oil extraction, and crude oil processing. Rahman et al. [79] quantified the 
GHG emissions from the recovery of five North American conventional crude oils. One 
of the crude oils included in their analysis was Mars crude oil, extracted from Mars 
platform that is used in this study as the crude oil extraction site. Rahman et al. [79] 
estimated air emissions associated with crude oil recovery operations such as well 
drilling, crude oil extraction, crude oil processing, and also emissions from venting, 
flaring, fugitives, and land-use change. Among these emissions, crude oil extraction, 
crude oil processing, and emissions from venting, flaring and fugitives were taken into 
account in the present study. 
Crude oil extraction consists of a number of steps in order to pull out the crude oil from 
reservoir to surface. Extraction of crude oil consumes a large amount of energy that 
consequently results in GHG emissions. It is worthy to mention that this energy is mainly 
used by recovery techniques – primary, secondary, and enhanced methods – applied to 
increase the production of the oil reservoir. At the primary method that extraction is at the 
early stages, reservoir pressure is enough to flow the oil through the production well; 
although, artificial lift technologies such as pumps are used when the pressure falls within 
the reservoir. Aging the reservoir and consequent decrease of the pressure, makes it 
necessary to use secondary method, such that water/gas is injected into the reservoir to 
boost the reservoir pressure for production. Further, the enhanced recovery method 
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including thermal recovery (steam injection), gas injection (i.e., natural gas, nitrogen, 
carbon dioxide), and chemical injection (i.e., polymers and detergent) is used to mobilize 
the remaining oil. Rahman et al. [79] calculated air emissions of crude oil extraction 
based on basic energy combustion equations for pumps, compressors, and other electric 
equipment. The emission for Mars crude oil was estimated to be 1.26 g-CO2 equivalent 
per each MJ of crude extracted [79]. 
Being mixed with water and gas after extraction, the crude oil needs processing to meet 
transportation quality requirement. The energy consumption needed to remove and treat 
these phases contributes to GHG emission. A gravity separator is usually used to separate 
oil, gas, and water, which is not a significant source of air emission. Natural gas-fired 
reboilers providing the heat required for crude oil stabilization, and pumps, are 
considered main causes of emissions for stabilizing of crude oil. Treatment of associated 
gas using an amine treater and a glycol dehydrator is the next step in crude oil processing, 
which has been already explained in of NG processing (see Section 4.2.1.2). The water 
that comes out from reservoir along with the oil crude, must meet environmental 
regulations before discharging. Therefore, the last step of crude oil processing entails 
treatment of the water associated with crude oil. This treatment includes reduction of oil, 
grease, sodium, and TDS (total dissolved solids) in water, which is energy consuming 
and a source of GHG emission. The emission factor for Mars crude oil processing 
estimated by Rahman et al. [79] is 0.79 g-CO2 e/MJ. 
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Venting – release of associated NG – and flaring – combustion of associated NG – are 
inevitable sources of air emissions in extraction sites. Venting and flaring may occur 
during emergency operations and necessary where a stream of NG cannot be safely or 
economically recovered. The flaring combustion product of NG includes carbon dioxide, 
methane, and nitrous oxide. The mass composition of unprocessed NG, used in this study 
to model NG flaring, is 78.3% CH4, 1.51% CO2, 1.77% nitrogen, and 17.8% non-
methane hydrocarbons [80]. The emission factors for unprocessed NG flaring are shown 
in Table 3.  
The leakage of NG through equipment such as valves, pumps, compressors, and other 
devices during extraction and processing operations is called fugitive emissions. These 
emissions usually cannot be captured for flaring due to economic limitations [45,79]. 
Rahman et al. [79] estimated venting, flaring, and fugitive volumes to be 1.33, 0.78, and 
0.21 m
3
 of NG per m
3
 of crude oil extracted, respectably. 
 
4.2.2.2 Crude oil transportation 
Transportation of crude oil along the ocean is generally done through subsea pipelines or 
ocean tankers (Figure 13). In this study marine tankers are assumed to transport the crude 
oil from the producing filed to the refinery, and the HFO from the refinery to the power 
plant. Ocean going vessels are among the major sources of GHG emissions in the world. 
This is primarily due to the large quantity of fuel, mostly residual fuel oil, consumed by 
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engines to propel the vessels. Air emission associated with maritime vessels is highly 
debated, and many studies have been conducted to evaluate their impacts. In this study, 
the approach of Clarkson [81] is adopted. That is, ocean oil tankers with slow-speed 
diesel main engine, medium-speed diesel auxiliary engine, and a capacity of 700,000 
barrels are assumed to be used for both crude oil and HFO transportation. Since the 
difference between crude oil and HFO densities, which in turn affects the volume of the 
liquids transported by each marine tanker trip, is insignificant, we assume that the amount 
of crude oil and HFO transported in each trip are the same. The ocean tankers 
specifications are listed in Table 7. 
 
 
Figure 13. A typical marine oil tanker used for oil transportation (www.wsj.com) 
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Table 7. Oil tanker specification 
Average service speed  Maximum  speed  Average main engine power Average Aux engine power 
14.7 Knots 16 Knots 9667 kW 2040 kW 
 
 
The emissions produced by main and auxiliary engines are calculated separately. The 
load factor for the main engine in each mode is calculated based upon the propeller law 
relationship equation [82]. Since the vessels do not operate at 100% maximum 
continuous rating (MCR), the correction of 0.83 is added for compensation [83]. 
𝐿𝐹 = 0.83 × (
𝐴𝑆
𝑆𝑆
)3                        (4.3) 
Where LF is load factor; AS is actual speed of the vessel, and SS is the service speed of 
the vessel. 
In order to calculate the vessel emissions, individual emission factors are required for 
each pollutant being investigated. Emission factors suggested by Goldsworthy & 
Renilson [84] were used in this study. These emission factors are presented in table 8. 
 
Table 8. Emission factors of marine tanker (g/kWh) 
 
Engine type N2O CO2 CH4 
Main (SSD) 0.031 622 0.006 
Aux. (MSD) 0.031 692 0.004 
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The amount of emissions produced by both the main and auxiliary engines is then 
calculated using Equation (4.4), proposed by Corbett et al [85]. 
𝐸 =  
𝑃×𝐿𝐹×𝐴×𝐸𝐹
1000
                        (4.4) 
Where E is the amount of emission in kg; P is the installed power of engine; A is the time 
of operation in that mode, and EF is the emission factor in g/kWh. The distances were 
estimated as 200 km from the oil field to the refinery, and 4,500 km from the refinery to 
the power plant using Google Map. 
 
4.2.2.3 Crude oil refining  
After crude oil arrives at refinery, it is refined (i.e., separated into smaller fractions) to 
produce various petroleum products. Figure 14 illustrates a schematic diagram of a 
typical refinery process. Refineries are considered one of the largest GHG-emission 
sources in industrial activities around world, mainly because of vast amount of energy 
consumption. Rahman et al. [86] developed a refinery model in HYSYS to quantify the 
energy consumption in each process unit of the refinery. The amount of energy consumed 
and the volume of the final products produced in the refinery were used as inputs to a 
spreadsheet-based model, FUNNELGHG-CCO, which traces energy combustion and 
quantify GHG emissions associated with each final product. They ran the model for 
different crude oils to process 150,000 barrels per day. Considering that electricity, heat, 
and steam are required for the refinery processing unit, it was assumed that NG is used to 
produce the heat and steam. To calculate the amount of NG required for heating and 
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steam production, the heater and boiler efficiencies were taken as 80% and 75%, 
respectively. The total GHG emissions were determined from the amount of NG, required 
electricity, and emission factors for the combustion of NG and grid electricity. The model 
estimated the emission associated with Mars crude oil refining to be 7.97 E 09 gr-CO2 
equivalents per day [86]. 
 
 
Figure 14. A schematic diagram of a typical refinery process (www.varoenergy.com) 
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4.3 Risk Analysis 
In order for a holistic risk analysis, the risks of potential fires and explosions for likely 
release of LNG and HFO at different stages from the extraction at offshore drilling 
platforms to the consumption at the power plant are to calculated though for a limited 
number of dominant stages. For this purpose, we employ FT technique to analyze the root 
causes of unwanted release of flammable materials LNG and HFO. The FTs developed in 
this way for each fuel are then mapped to the corresponding BNs to account for 
dependencies and conditional probabilities. Accordingly, ET technique is used to explore 
the consequences of such a release. In the next section the fuels of interest will be 
analyzed in detail.  
 
4.3.1 LNG life-cycle risk analysis 
The sequence of the processes which will be considered in the risk analysis of LNG life-
cycle is depicted in the right-hand side block of Figure 7. 
 
4.3.1.1 Natural gas extraction  
As can be seen from Figure 1, the first process considered in risk analysis of LNG life-
cycle in this study is the extraction of NG at the offshore drilling rig. Assuming an 
overbalanced drilling, an undesired kick and the ensuing blowout are considered as the 
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most likely release scenario [52,87]. The developed FT and BN of an undesired kick and 
the ET of the evolution of the kick to a blowout have been displayed in Figures 15, 16 
and 17, respectively. 
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Figure 15. Fault tree analysis of offshore drilling 
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Figure 16. Undesired kick Bayesian network 
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Figure 17. Event tree analysis of offshore drilling 
 
4.3.1.2 Natural gas transportation (pipeline) 
After being extracted at Thebaud platform, NG is transported ashore via subsea pipeline. 
The pipe rupture can then be considered as the most likely release scenario as shown in 
the FT and BN of Figures 18 and 19. Based on the function/malfunction of the safety 
measures in place the consequences of a pipe rupture can be investigated using the ET as 
shown in Figure 20. 
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Figure 18. Fault tree of sub-sea pipe rupture 
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Figure 19. BN of sub-sea pipe rupture 
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Figure 20. Event tree of sub-sea pipe rupture 
 
 
4.3.1.3 Natural gas liquefaction  
The natural gas which is transported ashore should be liquefied for the ease of storage 
and transportation. The root causes of a gas release scenario have been displayed in the 
FT and BN of Figures 21 and 22, respectively. The corresponding ET to investigate the 
likely consequences of such gas releases has been depicted in Figure 23. 
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Figure 21. Fault tree of gas release in the liquefaction facility 
 
 
Figure 22. Bayesian network of gas release in the liquefaction facility 
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Figure 23. Event tree of gas release in liquefaction facility 
 
 
4.3.1.4 LNG storage 
After being liquefied, LNG is stored in LNG storage tanks. These storage tanks can store 
LNG at the very low temperature of -162 °C usually thanks to their double-container 
structure. The inner container contains LNG while the outer one contains insulation 
materials. In LNG storage tanks if LNG vapors are not released, the pressure and 
temperature within the tank will increase which in turn can lead to a tank explosion. LNG 
is a cryogen, and is kept in its liquid state at very low temperatures. The temperature 
within the tank will remain constant if the pressure is kept constant by allowing the boil 
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off gas to escape from the tank. This is known as auto-refrigeration. The FT and BN in 
Figures 24 and 25 illustrate the root causes which can result in a gas release, respectively. 
The consequences of such a release are shown using the ET in Figure 26. 
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Figure 24. Fault tree of gas release from LNG storage tank 
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Figure 25. Bayesian network of gas release from LNG storage tank 
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Figure 26. Event tree of gas release in LNG storage tank 
 
 
4.3.1.5 LNG transportation (shipping) 
The LNG stored at Goldboro Plant, Nova Scotia, is shipped by marine tankers to 
Holyrood, Newfoundland. The major accident scenarios which could result in an LNG 
release consist of either damages to the tanks or accidents which threaten the ship 
physical/operational integrity. FTs developed in Figures 27-29 display the root causes of 
such accident scenarios. Further, Figure 30 shows the BN developed from the FTs of the 
accident.  Likewise, the likely outcomes of such an LNG release can be represented as 
the ET in Figure 26. 
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Figure 27. Fault tree for LNG release during shipping 
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Figure 28. Fault tree for LNG release during shipping (Part A) 
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Figure 29. Fault tree for LNG release during shipping (Part B) 
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Figure 30. Bayesian network for LNG release during shipping 
 
 
4.3.1.6 LNG re-gasification 
In order to be used as a fuel, LNG should be returned to its gaseous state via re-
gasification process. In a conventional re-gasification plant, LNG is heated by sea water 
to convert it to natural gas/methane gas. The root causes of an undesired gas release 
during the re-gasification process have been depicted in FT and BN of Figures 31 and 32, 
respectively. The ET of Figure 23 can also be used to analyze the potential accidents. 
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Figure 31. Fault tree for gas release during re-gasification process 
 
 
Figure 32. Bayesian network for gas release during re-gasification process 
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4.3.2 HFO life-cycle risk analysis 
The sequence of the processes which will be considered in risk analysis of HFO life-cycle 
is depicted in the right-hand side block of Figure 8. 
 
4.3.2.1 Crude oil extraction 
In the present study, the extraction of both NG and crude oil is conducted using offshore 
drilling platforms. As such, assuming an overbalanced drilling operation, the root causes 
of a kick as the most likely release scenario and the potential blowout can be modeled 
using the same FT, BN and ET as developed in Figures 15, 16, and 17, respectively. 
 
4.3.2.2 Crude oil transportation (shipping) 
After being extracted from Gulf of Mexico, crude oil is transported to Alliance refinery 
via marine tankers. Similar to that of LNG, the root causes of a hydrocarbon release can 
be depicted in FTs of Figures 33-35. Accordingly, Figure 36 presents the BN developed 
from these FTs. The likely outcomes of such accident are shown in ET of Figure 37. 
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Figure 33. Fault tree for crude oil release during shipping 
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Figure 34. Fault tree for crude oil release during shipping (Part A) 
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Figure 35. Fault tree for crude oil release during shipping (Part B) 
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Figure 36. Bayesian network for crude oil release during shipping 
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Figure 37. Event tree analysis of crude oil release during shipping 
 
 
4.3.2.3 Crude oil storage 
After arriving at the refinery, the crude is stored in storage tanks before being refined to 
products of interest. Storage tanks come in different sizes and shapes. Special 
applications might require tanks to be rectangular, vertical or horizontal cylinders, or 
even spherical. Horizontal cylinders and spheres are generally used for pressurized 
storage of hydrocarbon or chemical products. For crude oil and its products, however, the 
atmospheric or low-pressure storage tanks are usually used which are vertical cylindrical 
in shape with fixed or floating roofs.  The FT and corresponding BN for an unwanted 
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release of fuel oil from the storage tanks are illustrated in figures 38 and 39, respectively. 
The ET of figure 37 can be used to investigate the potential consequences of such 
accident. 
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Figure 38. Fault tree of undesired release from storage tanks  
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Figure 39. Bayesian network of oil release from oil storage tank 
 
 
4.3.2.4 Crude oil refining 
The crude oil is then processed and refined in Alliance Refinery in order to be converted 
into more useful products such as petroleum naphtha, gasoline, diesel, asphalt base, 
heating oil, kerosene and liquefied petroleum gas (LPG). Generally, crude petroleum is 
heated and changed into a gas using a fired boiler (furnace). The hot gases are passed into 
the bottom of a distillation column and become cooler as they move up the height of the 
column. As the gases cool below their boiling point, they condense into a liquid. The 
liquids are then drawn off the distillation column at specific heights, ranging from heavy 
residuals at the bottom, raw diesel fuels in the mid-sections, and raw gasoline at the top. 
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These raw fractions are then processed further to make several different finished 
products. 
Considering a distillation column, a furnace, and a heat exchanger as the major hazard 
installations in the refinery, FTs for unwanted release of flammable materials from those 
have been developed as depicted in Figures 40-42. A unique BN developed 
corresponding to the FTs is shown in Figure 43, and the likely consequences such release 
can pose are presented in ET of Figure 44. 
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Figure 40. Fault tree of undesired release from an atmospheric distillation column 
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Figure 41. Fault tree of undesired release from a fired furnace 
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Figure 42. Fault tree for heat exchanger explosion 
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Figure 43. Bayesian network of oil release in refinery 
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Figure 44. Event tree analysis of oil release in refinery 
 
 
4.3.2.5 HFO transportation (shipping)  
The HFO produced in Alliance refinery is then transported to Hollyrood thermal station. 
Since marine tankers are assumed to transport both HFO and crude oil in the present 
study; therefore, the root causes of a hydrocarbon release and likely consequences can be 
presented using the same FTs, BN, and ET as developed in Figures 33-37, respectively. 
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Chapter 5 
Results and Discussion 
 
 
5.1 Comparison of life-cycle emissions  
Based on the total volume of the fossil fuels required by Hollyrood power plant to 
generate the annual electricity, the emission factors and the life-cycle GHG emissions 
were estimated for both LNG and HFO. Theses emissions in form of tons of CO2 
equivalent (tons CO2 e) are presented in Tables 9 and 10 for LNG and HFO, 
respectively. However, it should be noted that due to the generic data and the emission 
factors, mainly extracted from the literatures, and also the simplifying assumptions made 
in the calculations of life cycle emissions, there is a high level of uncertainty in the 
results of the present study. The results of the LCA indicate that the total GHG emissions 
produced throughout HFO life-cycle (8,460,180 tons CO2 e) are considerably higher than 
those of LNG (488,437 tons CO2 e), which is in accordance with previous studies [46].  
The difference between the emissions of HFO and LNG is partly due to the different 
processes considered in the life-cycle of each fuel and partly due to different parameters 
even in case of similar processes. For example, comparing the emissions in the domain of 
transportation, not only the distances in which the LNG (~225 km) and HFO (~ 4700 km) 
are transported are different but also the modes of transportation for the fuels are not the 
same (e.g., LNG pipeline vs. HFO marine tankers). In the HFO life-cycles, the most 
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GHG emission is related to the refinery stage (76%) whereas in the case of LNG it is 
assigned to the liquefaction plant (40%).  
For the sake of better comparison of the two fuels, the total emissions can be converted 
into monetary values. To this end, the British Colombia province carbon tax – defined as 
a tax based on GHG generation – which is 30 CAD per metric ton of CO2 equivalent (in 
year 2012) is considered in the present study. The results have been presented as carbon 
tax in Tables 9 and 10. As can be noted, the carbon tax of HFO is about 17 times larger 
than that of LNG, making the latter a much economical (and cleaner) fuel than the 
former.  
 
 
Table 9. GHG emissions associated with LNG life-cycle 
 
Emission Source Emission (Tons CO2 e) Contribution (%) 
NG Extraction 123,838 25 
NG Processing 25,787 5 
NG Pipeline 81,891 17 
NG Liquefaction 192,000 40 
LNG Carrier 4,920 1 
Re-gasification 60,000 12 
Total 488,437  
Carbon Tax ($) 14,653,135  
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Table 10. GHG emissions associated with HFO life-cycle 
Emission Source Emission (Tons CO2 e) Contribution (%) 
Crude Oil Extraction 938,910 11 
Crude Oil Processing 588,690 7 
Venting, Flaring and Fugitives 441,450 5 
Oil Tanker (oil field to refinery) 10,530 0.5 
Oil Refinery 6,470,100 76 
Oil Tanker (refinery to power plant) 10,500 0.5 
Total 8,460,180  
Carbon Tax ($) 253,805,400  
 
 
5.2. Comparison of safety risks  
The probabilities assigned to the root nodes of the BNs and to the safety barriers of the 
ET for the hydrocarbon release scenarios are displayed in Tables 11-13. These 
probabilities are either extracted from the literature or estimated by experts [58,88-101]. 
Calculating the top event probabilities (hydrocarbon release) in each BN, the probabilities 
of the corresponding consequences can also be estimated. The risk of each consequence 
is then calculated as the product of the probability of the consequence and the envisaged 
loss values, expressed in monetary value. Table 14 presents the respective loss values 
used in the present study [93]. As the LCAs were conducted on an annual basis, for the 
sake of consistency, the risks were also estimated for one year.   
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Table 11. Root causes probabilities used for LNG risk analysis 
 
No. Root Cause Probability No. Root Cause Probability 
Extraction LNG Shipping 
1  Annular losses 1.00E-02 46 Engine room 9.50E-03 
2  Riser rupture 1.00E-02  47 cargo handling module 1.20E-04 
3  Temperature effects 2.50E-03  48 Boiler 2.30E-04 
4  Gas-cut mud 7.00E-03  49 Lightning  3.40E-02 
5  Failure of density meter 2.00E-04  50 Heavy Sea Conditions  3.20E-03 
6  Operator error in mixing density 3.00E-02  51 Storm 8.73E-02 
7  Pump failure 4.00E-02  52 Tsunami  2.39E-02 
8  Power failure 2.70E-04  53 Transfer Arm Release 7.80E-03 
9  Pump control failure 1.00E-03  54 Propulsion system failure 7.00E-04 
10  Efficient hydrocarbon formation 1.25E-01  55 Radar system failure 1.00E-03 
NG Liquefaction  56 Steering system failure 5.20E-04 
11 Absorber Leakage  2.00E-04  57 Human Error 1.30E-03 
12 Regenerator Leakage 1.80E-03  58 Environmental factors 1.00E-03 
13 Reboiler Leakage 3.00E-04  59 Navigational Error 4.10E-04 
14 Pump Leakage 6.00E-03  60 Iceberg 2.32E-04 
15 Valves/Joints 2.30E-04  61 Platforms 6.70E-05 
16 Tank Leakage 1.00E-04  62 Dropped objects 2.80E-03 
17 Compressor Leakage 1.40E-05  63 Anchoring Failure 3.20E-04 
18 Flash Leakage 5.00E-04  64 Propulsion system failure 7.00E-04 
19 HEX Leakage 1.00E-02  65 Radar system failure 1.00E-03 
20 C-SCRUB Column 2.80E-05  66 Steering system failure 5.20E-04 
21 N-Column Leakage 3.00E-03  67 Tug boat Error 1.20E-04 
89 
 
LNG Storage Tank  68 Uncharted obstacles 5.30E-04 
 22 Under Pressurization  2.90E-10 Gas sub-sea pipeline 
 23 Tank reaches vacuum pressure 1.36E-05 69 Manufacturing defects 1.35E-04 
 24 Vacuum PSV fails to open 2.12E-05  70 Material defects 3.44E-03 
 25 Overfilling 1.20E-05  71 welding defects 1.08E-02 
 26 Tank level reaches high level 3.70E-04  72 Malfunction of relief valve 2.59E-04 
 27 LSHH fails to signal 1.00E-03  73 Pigging error 1.09E-02 
 28 Inlet Valve fails to close 3.14E-02  74 Thermal forces 4.20E-03 
 29 Major Mechanical Failures 8.80E-06  75 Hydrodynamic forces 5.16E-04 
 30 Over Pressurization 1.04E-03  76 Ship anchors 2.15E-03 
 31 Rollover  1.00E-03  77 Wear abrasion 8.53E-04 
 32 Boil-Off Gas removal failure 4.10E-05  78 Minor anchors 3.05E-02 
 33 Natural Hazards 1.33E-01  79 Trawls 4.11E-03 
 34 Flood  2.65E-02  80 Corrosive environment 1.00E+00 
 35 Earthquake  2.39E-02  81 Internal coating failure 2.41E-04 
 36 Storm 8.73E-02  82 CO2 2.22E-06 
Re-gasification  83 O2 3.52E-06 
 37 Unloading Arms Leakage 3.40E-07  84 H2S 1.41E-05 
 38 LNG Storage Tank 2.00E-05  85 H2O 1.99E-05 
 39 Compressor  1.40E-05  86 Iceberg 2.32E-04 
 40 Blower  4.20E-04  87 Earthquake 2.39E-02 
 41 Re-liquefier Leakage 2.50E-04  88 Storm 1.69E-02 
 42 Primary Pump Leakage 6.00E-03 
    43 Secondary Pump Leakage 6.00E-03 
    44 Valves / Joints 5.00E-06 
    45 Vaporizers Leakage  3.10E-03 
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Table 12. Root causes probabilities used for HFO risk analysis 
 
 
No. Root Cause Probability 
Oil Storage Tank 
1 Maintenance Error 3.10E-02 
2 High Pressure 1.00E-04 
3 Joining Error 4.60E-03 
4 Poor Foundation 2.40E-05 
5 PSV Failure 2.59E-04 
6 Inlet Valve fails to Close 2.06E-04 
7 Feeding Pump Failure 5.00E-04 
8 Level Indicator Failure 1.70E-05 
9 Corrosion 2.00E-03 
10 Manufacturing Defects 1.20E-05 
11 Damage During Installation 4.30E-03 
12 Joints/Gaskets 2.30E-04 
13 Design Error 1.30E-05 
14 Inadequate Maintenance 1.20E-03 
15 Monitoring Error 3.40E-03 
Oil Refinery 
16 Solids in feed 4.20E-05 
17 Fouling  6.50E-04 
18 Process Measuring Element Failure  1.76E-03 
19 Control Valve Failure 2.80E-05 
20 Transmission Signal Failure 1.70E-03 
21 Pump-around Failure 5.00E-04 
22 Reflux Valve Failure 2.80E-05 
23 Condenser Failure 2.19E-04 
24 Reflux Pump Failure 5.00E-04 
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25 Closed Block Valve  3.98E-04 
26 Working Boiler 2.60E-04 
27 Design Error 1.30E-05 
28 Inadequate Maintenance 1.20E-03 
29 Monitoring Error 3.40E-03 
30 PSV Failure 2.59E-04 
31 Fatigue (Column) 1.50E-04 
32 Corrosion (Column) 2.00E-03 
33 External Excessive Heat 1.54E-04 
34 Failure of Heating Fluid Feed Valve  2.06E-04 
35 Cooling system failure 2.19E-04 
36 Failure of Oil Feeding Valve 2.06E-04 
37 Failure of Block Valve 3.98E-04 
38 Isolation Valve failure  5.90E-05 
39 Relief Valve Failure 2.59E-04 
40 Rupture Disk Failure 3.30E-04 
41 Plugging 3.16E-02 
42 Pressure Controller Failure 1.76E-03 
43 Coke build-up 5.10E-02 
44 Heat Controller Failure 2.50E-04 
45 Soot Blower Failure 1.40E-04 
46 Flame Impingement 4.20E-03 
47 After Burning 3.60E-03 
48 Fatigue (Furnace) 1.57E-04 
49 Corrosion (Furnace) 1.90E-04 
50 Thermal Shock  2.40E-03 
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Table 13. Safety barrier probabilities used in event trees 
 
ID  Safety Barrier Probability 
1  Minor Release 8.00E-05 
2  Major Release 1.00E-04 
3  Immediate Ignition 1.00E-01 
4  Delayed Ignition 3.00E-01 
5  Gas detector Failure 4.00E-02 
6  Emergency Evacuation  2.00E-01 
7  Pressure monitoring  1.00E-03 
8  Automatic shot-off valve 1.00E-02 
9  Alarm 1.00E-02 
10  Manual shot-off valve 3.00E-02 
11  Kick non-detection 8.60E-06 
12  Lower pipe ram 1.00E-04 
13  Upper pipe ram 1.00E-04 
14  Blind/shear ram 1.00E-04 
15  Annular preventer 1.00E-04 
16  Casing 2.00E-04 
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Table 14. Risk loss values and categories (Kalantarnia et al. 2010) 
Severity  
class 
Dollar 
value 
(USD) 
Asset loss Human loss Environmental loss Reputation loss 
1 < 1 k Not significant No injury No remediation required Noticed by operating unit 
2 1 K - 10 K Short term production interruption 
Minor injury, first aid 
attention required 
Around the operating 
unit; easy recovery and 
remediation 
Noticed in the operation 
line/ line supervisor,  
3 
10 K - 500 
K 
Damage of one unit, requiring 
repair; medium term production 
interruption 
One injury, requiring 
hospitalization;  no life 
threat 
Around the operating 
line; easy recovery and 
remediation 
Noticed in plant 
4 
500 K - 5 
M 
Damage of more than one unit' 
requiring repair/long term 
production interruption 
More than one injuries, 
requiring hospitalization; no 
life threat 
Within plant; short term 
remediation effort 
Local media coverage 
5 5 M - 50 M Loss of one operating unit/product 
Multiple major injuries, 
potential disabilities, 
potential life threat 
Minor offsite impact; 
remediation cost < 1 M  
Regional media coverage; 
brief note on national 
media 
6 
50 M- 500 
M 
Loss of a major portion of facility/ 
product 
One fatality and/or multiple 
injuries with disabilities 
Community alerted; 
remediation cost < 5 M 
National media coverage; 
brief note on international 
media 
7 > 500 M Total loss of facility/products Multiple fatalities 
Community evacuation; 
remediation cost > 5 M  
National media coverage, 
asking for international 
aid 
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The risks assessed for the LNG and HFO life-cycles are presented in Tables 15 and 16, 
respectively. As can be seen, LNG life-cycle has a significantly lower risk (~ 2.5 million 
USD) than that of HFO life-cycle (~ 5.6 million USD). In LNG life-cycle, the 
liquefaction (57.5%) and re-gasification (41%) processes contribute the most to the safety 
risk whereas in HFO life-cycle, the oil refinery (99.5%) accounts for nearly the entire 
safety risk, mostly due to the occurrence of high-probability high-impact major accidents 
as fires and explosions. In Figure 45, the total amounts of losses, due to both the 
emissions and safety risks, of both fuels have been depicted. As can be seen, in terms of 
both emission and safety risk, LNG can be chosen as a safer and cleaner fuel. Regarding 
the HFO, the amount of safety risk does not compare to the amount of environmental 
emission (the safety risk is ~ 2% of the total losses); however, in case of LNG, the safety 
risk accounts for about 17% of the total losses, which is quite notable. Nevertheless, it 
should be noted that in the present study the emissions resulted from the combustion of 
fuels due to accidents, particularly fires and explosions, have been ignored due to the lack 
of relevant data about the volume of released fuel during each accident scenario. 
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Table 15. Risks related to the LNG life-cycle 
Stage Risk ($) Contribution (%) 
Drilling 13,334.36 0.5  
NG Pipeline  10,527.42 0.4 
NG Liquefaction 1,426,205.86 57.5 
LNG Storage 50.82 0.002 
LNG Shipping 6,652.77 0.3 
Re-gasification 1,019,426.91 41 
Total 2,476,198.17  
 
 
Table 16. Risks related to the HFO life-cycle 
Stage Risk ($) Contribution 
Drilling 13,334.36 0.25 
Oil Shipping 7,316.68 0.13 
Oil Storage 17.60 0.0003 
Oil Refinery 5,551,074.76 99.5 
HFO Shipping 7,316.68 0.13 
Total 5,579,060.11  
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Figure 45. Comparison of life-cycle emissions and safety risks for LNG and HFO 
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Chapter 6 
Conclusions  
 
In the present work, we introduced a methodology for risk-based life-cycle assessment 
(RBLCA) of fuels, considering both environmental emissions and safety risks incurred 
during the entire life-cycles thereof. For this purpose, the emissions of greenhouse gases 
to the atmosphere were calculated, converted into CO2 equivalent, and then quantified to 
monetary values based on carbon tax imposed by government. Likewise, the safety risks 
resulted from undesired releases of fuels and the ensuing fires and explosions were 
calculated using quantitative risk analysis techniques such as event tree and Bayesian 
network throughout the processes involved in the entire life-cycle of fuels. We 
exemplified the application of the methodology to liquefied natural gas (LNG) and heavy 
fuel oil (HFO) as the fuels of a fossil-fuel power plant in Newfoundland, Canada, so that 
the fuel with the less total losses (i.e., the losses due to both environmental emissions and 
safety risks) can be determined. Considering the emissions and risks throughout the 
respective life cycles, from extraction at offshore platforms to combustion in onshore 
power plants, it was demonstrated that not only LNG is by far a cleaner fuel than HFO 
(17 times less emissions) but also a safer alternative than HFO. In the present study, the 
inclusion of safety risks in the life-cycle risk assessment of LNG and HFO did not affect 
the preference of the fuels that could have been determined solely based on their 
environmental emissions. Nonetheless, it was demonstrated that in some cases, the safety 
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risks can make a significant contribution to the total amount of losses (e.g., about 17% in 
the case of LNG in this study) which in slightly different situations can lead to quite 
different priorities in deciding the safer and/or cleaner fuel alternatives.  
 
Recommendations 
This method should be applied to compare other fuels, e.g. Coal and biofuel, with natural 
gas in order to ensure that NG is the safest fuel. As a matter of fact, considering a real 
case study, using real data if available, and consequently reducing assumptions would 
result in more accurate results, which is critical to make any comparison. Moreover, 
developing techniques that make it possible to estimate the emissions associated with an 
accident, and considering the amount of emissions as a basis for comparison would lead 
to more interesting results. 
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